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Abstract
We consider the problem of optimum joint information embedding and lossy com-
pression with respect to a ¯delity criterion. The decompressed composite sequence
(stegotext) is distorted by a stationary memoryless attack, resulting in a forgery which
in turn is fed into the decoder, whose task is to retrieve the embedded information.
The goal of this paper is to characterize the maximum achievable embedding rate Re
(the embedding capacity Ce) as a function of the compression (composite) rate Rc and
the allowed average distortion level ¢, such that the average probability of error in
decoding of the embedded message can be made arbitrarily small for su±ciently large
block length. We characterize the embedding capacity and demonstrate how it can
be approached in principle. We also provide a single-letter expression of the minimum
achievable composite rate as a function of Re and ¢, below which there exists no reliable
embedding scheme.
1 Introduction
The subject of watermarking and information embedding has been attracting a vast amount
of attention of both the academic world and the industry, due to an increasing awareness
for the need of data protection in its various forms: ownership identi¯cation, data forgery
exposure, etc., as is extensively surveyed in e.g., [1]-[4] as well as in many other publi-
cations. Generally speaking, a good watermarking code should satisfy several con°icting
requirements: One the one hand, the watermark should be perceptually transparent, that is,
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1invisible to the naked eye, or, when audio signals are concerned, inaudible to the innocent
listener, while on the other hand, the watermark must also be robust to both conventional
data processing (e.g., lossy compression, up/down-scaling, ¯ltering, halftoning) and to po-
tential malicious attacks by a party who may wish to invalidate the watermark by creating
a forgery.
While most of the existing practical watermarking applications were designed and tested
empirically (see, e.g., [1]-[5]), the information-theoretic research activity in the problem area
of watermarking is relatively new, and it focuses primarily on issues of system modelling,
performance criteria, watermarking code design, and theoretical performance bounds. From
the information-theoretic point of view, the watermarking problem is usually regarded [6]
as an instance of channel coding with side information [19]-[21], where the role of the side
information is played by the covertext. The case where the side information is available to
the encoder only is referred to as public watermarking, whereas the case where it is available
to the decoder as well is termed private watermarking. In a variety of works (see, e.g., [7]-
[10]) the watermarking problem is modelled as a game between the information hider and
the attacker, where the former wishes to maximize a certain objective function, like the
capacity or error exponent, while the latter strives to minimize this objective function.
Another aspect of the watermarking problem is that of joint information embedding
and lossy compression, where quantization and entropy coding of the stegotext is carried
out as an integral part of the watermarking scheme. The problem is as follows: There is
a set of messages to be embedded in the covertext subject to some distortion constraint.
The composite sequence resulting from this embedding is compressed losslessly and the
embedded message must be reliably decodable with or without access to the original host
data, either directly from the stegotext or from its forgery. Although the compression of
the composite sequence is lossless, the entire process is lossy since the reconstruction of
the covertext from stegotext cannot be perfect after the watermark embedding. Karakos
and Papamarcou [11, 12, 13], Willems and Kalker [14], and Merhav and Maor [22], study
the tradeo®s between the distortion, the embedding rate and the composite rate, that is,
the rate of lossless compression of the stegotext. In [11] and [12], the private watermarking
(¯ngerprinting) problem is treated for the attack-free case and in the presence of the attack,
respectively, assuming a Gaussian-quadratic model. In [11], the watermark is retrieved di-
rectly from the stegotext, while in [12] the stegotext is subjected to an additive Gaussian
2attack resulting in a forgery from which the watermark is retrieved. For both cases, the
achievable rate region is established in terms of the relations between the composite rate,
the embedding rate and the prescribed distortion constraint. In [13], along with an extended
analysis of the results of [11, 12], the achievable region is established for the ¯nite alphabet
case of private watermarking, and a general memoryless attack on the stegotext. Willems
and Kalker [14] study the attack-free case of the public joint watermarking-compression
problem for a ¯nite alphabet covertext. The model in [14] assumes that the composite
sequence is losslessly compressed symbol-by-symbol, the watermark is retrieved from re-
constructed stegotext and, in addition, the covertext is estimated from the stegotext. The
achievable region of composite rates, embedding rates, and distortion levels is characterized
and a random binning argument is proposed for achieving any given point in the achievable
region. In [22], the attack-free public version of the problem is treated, both for the ¯nite
alphabet and the continuous alphabet cases. As in [11] and [14], the data hiding and com-
pression are cooperative and therefore are optimized jointly, but unlike in [14], the lossless
compression is performed per block rather than symbol-by-symbol. The main result of [22]
is a single-letter expression of the minimum achievable composite rate as a function of the
embedding rate and the allowable average distortion.
In this paper, we extend the model of [22] to include a stationary memoryless attack
channel operating on the composite sequence. As in [22], the goal of this paper is to
characterize the best achievable tradeo®s between the embedding rate Re, the allowable
average distortion ¢, and the composite rate Rc. The main result is a single-letter expression
of the maximum achievable embedding rate Re (embedding capacity Ce) as a function of
Rc and ¢. We further argue that the achievable rate region of the continuous case is given
by the same expression as in the ¯nite-alphabet case.
The results of [22] are, of course, obtained as a special case for which the attack channel
is the identity channel (i.e., no attack), but then (as in [22]), there is no longer need for the
(Gel`fand-Pinsker) auxiliary random variable U since it simply coincides with the single-
letter random variable Y that represents the stegotext. Indeed, the proof of achievability
part in [22] is conceptually simpler and does not have the binning structure of the more
general coding scheme presented here, which is in the spirit of the one of Gel`fand and
Pinsker. In the presence of an attack, the choice of U = Y is, in general, no longer optimal.
This is in contrast to private watermarking [13], where the choice U = Y is optimal for
3all achievable embedding rates. It should be pointed out that for the continuous case, in
the absence of the attack, the Gel`fand-Pinsker upper-bound on Re can be safely omitted
[22], due to the fact that not only is the watermark reliably recoverable from the composite
sequence (there is a one-to-one mapping), but also, there is no limitation on the number of
composite sequences (in contrast to the ¯nite-alphabet case), except for the one imposed
by the compressibility requirement.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we establish notation conventions used
throughout the paper. Section 3 contains the system description and the problem de¯nition.
The coding theorem is presented in Section 4, and Sections 5 and 6 contain the proofs of
the converse and the direct parts, respectively.
2 Notation Conventions and Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, scalar random variables will be denoted by capital letters, spe-
ci¯c values they may take will be denoted by the corresponding lower case letters, and
their alphabets, as well as most of the other sets, will be denoted by calligraphic let-
ters. Similarly, random vectors, their realizations, and their alphabets will be denoted,
respectively, by boldface capital letters, the corresponding boldface lower case letters, and
calligraphic letters, superscripted by the dimensions. The notations x
j
i and X
j
i , where i
and j are integers and i · j, will designate segments (xi;:::;xj) and (Xi;:::;Xj), respec-
tively, where for i = 1, the the subscript will be omitted. For example, the random vector
X = XN = XN
1 = (X1;:::;XN), (N-positive integer) may take a speci¯c vector value
x = xN = xN
1 = (x1;:::;xN) in X N, the Nth order Cartesian power of X, which is the
alphabet of each component of this vector. The cardinality of a ¯nite set X will be denoted
by jXj. For i > j, x
j
i (or X
j
i ) will be understood as the null string.
Sources and channels will be denoted generically by the letter P subscripted by the name
of the random variable and its conditioning, if applicable, e.g., PX(x) is the probability
of X = x, PY jX(yjx) is the conditional probability of Y = y given X = x, and so on.
Whenever clear from the context, these subscripts will be omitted. The class of all discrete
memoryless sources (DMSs) with a ¯nite alphabet X will be denoted by P(X), with PX
denoting a particular DMS in P(X), i.e.,
P(X) = fPX :
X
x2X
PX(x) = 1; 8x 2 X; PX(x) ¸ 0g: (1)
4For a given positive integer N, the probability of any N-vector x = (x1;:::;xN) drawn from
a DMS PX, is given by
PrfXi = xi; i = 1;:::;Ng =
N Y
i=1
PX(xi)
4
= PX(x): (2)
Information-theoretic quantities will be denoted using the conventional notations [15,
16, 17]: For a pair of discrete random variables (X;Y ) with a joint distribution PXY (x;y) =
PX(x)PY jX(yjx), the entropy of X will be denoted by H(X), the joint entropy - by H(X;Y ),
the conditional entropy of Y given X - by H(Y jX), and the mutual information by I(X;Y ),
where logarithms are de¯ned to the base 2. When we wish to emphasize the dependence of
an information-theoretic quantity on the underlying distribution, we will use the latter as
a subscript, for example, the entropy of X, induced by the source PX, will be denoted by
HPX(X). The binary entropy function will be denoted by
h(®)
4
= ¡®log® ¡ (1 ¡ ®)log(1 ¡ ®); 0 · ® · 1: (3)
A distortion measure (or distortion function) is a mapping from X £ Y into the set of
non-negative reals:
d : X £ Y ! R+: (4)
The distortion functions considered in the paper, are bounded, i.e.,
dmax
4
= max
(x;y)2X£Y
d(x;y) < 1: (5)
The additive distortion d(x;y) between two vectors x 2 X N and y 2 YN is given by:
d(x;y) =
1
N
N X
i=1
d(xi;yi): (6)
We next describe the generic notation related to the method of types, which is widely
used throughout this paper. For a given generic random variable (RV) A 2 A (or a vector of
RV's taking on values in A), and a vector a 2 AN, the empirical probability mass function
(EPMF) is a vector Pa = fPa(a);a 2 Ag, where Pa(a) is the relative frequency of the letter
a 2 A in the vector a. For a scalar ± > 0, the set T ±
PA of all ±-typical sequences is the set
of the sequences a 2 AN such that
(1 ¡ ±)PA(a) · Pa(a) · (1 + ±)PA(a) (7)
5for every a 2 A. The size of T ±
PA is bounded [16] by :
2N[(1¡±)2H(A)¡±] · jT±
PAj · 2N[(1+±)2H(A)]: (8)
It is also well-known (by the weak law of large numbers) that:
Pr
©
A = 2 T±
PA
ª
· ± (9)
for all N su±ciently large.
For a given generic channel PBjA(bja) and for each a 2 T ±
PA, the set T±
PBjA(a) of all
sequences b that are jointly ±-typical with a, is the set of all b such that:
(1 ¡ ±)Pa(a)PBjA(bja) · Pab(a;b) · (1 + ±)Pa(a)PBjA(bja); (10)
for all a 2 A;b 2 B, where Pab(a;b) denotes the fraction of occurrences of the pair (a;b)
in (a;b). Similarly as in eq. (7) [16], for all a 2 T ±
PA, the size of T±
PBjA(a) is bounded as
follows:
2N[(1¡±)2H(BjA)¡±] · jT±
PBjA(a)j · 2N[(1+±)2H(BjA)]: (11)
Finally, observe that for all x 2 T ±
PX and y 2 T±
PY jX(x), d(x;y) is upper bounded by:
d(x;y) · (1 + ±)2 X
x;y
PXPY jX(yjx)d(x;y)
4
= (1 + ±)2Ed(X;Y ): (12)
3 System Description and Problem De¯nition
Consider a general block coding scheme for joint watermark embedding and compression
depicted in Fig. 1: A DMS PX produces a sequence X = (X1;:::;XN) according to (2). This
sequence will be referred to as the covertext sequence. One of M possible watermarking
messages, v 2 f0;1;:::;M ¡ 1g, is embedded into the covertext X. It is assumed that the
message v is uniformly distributed across f0;1;:::;M ¡ 1g, independently of X, i.e.,
PrfV = vg =
1
M
for all v 2 f0;1;:::;M ¡ 1g: (13)
The embedding rate of the scheme, Re is de¯ned by
Re
4
=
1
N
logM: (14)
The encoder (embedder) maps each pair (x;v) into a composite sequence, henceforth
denoted as y = (y1;y2;:::;yN), whose components take on values in a ¯nite alphabet Y.
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Figure 1: Block diagram of the system.
The encoder is de¯ned by the embedding function ÁN(¢;¢):
y = ÁN(x;v)
4
=
¡
Á1(x;v);Á2(x;v);:::;ÁN(x;v)
¢
(15)
where Án(¢;¢), n = f1;:::;Ng is the projection of ÁN(¢;¢), corresponding to the n-th coor-
dinate. In order to maintain reasonable quality of the composite sequence, the following
constraint is imposed: The expected distortion between the composite sequence y and the
source sequence x, de¯ned by
Ed(X;Y)
4
= Ed(X;ÁN(X;V )) =
X
x
X
v
1
M
PX(x)
1
N
N X
n=1
d(xn;Án(x;v)) (16)
should not exceed a prescribed level ¢.
The composite sequence y is entropy-coded, and the corresponding composite rate is
de¯ned by
H
¡
ÁN(X;V )
¢
N
; (17)
and should not exceed a prescribed value, Rc.
The compressed composite sequence is sent to the decoder. After the decompression
and before the watermarking decoding, y is distorted by an attacker modelled as a discrete
stationary memoryless channel PZjY (zjy), which produces a forgery z = (z1;z2;:::;zN),
whose components take on values in a ¯nite alphabet Z. The decoder, that estimates the
embedded message from z, is given by:
b v = 'N(z); (18)
7where
'N : ZN ! f0;1;:::;M ¡ 1g: (19)
The quality of the estimation of V is judged according to the average probability of error,
Pe, de¯ned by:
Pe
4
= Prf'N(Z) 6= V g: (20)
An achievable embedding rate Re for a pair (Rc;¢) is an embedding rate, de¯ned as
in (14), such that for every ² > 0, there exists a su±cient large N, an encoder ÁN and a
decoder 'N, that satisfy Pe · ², Ed(X;Y) · ¢ and
H
¡
ÁN(X;V )
¢
N · Rc. Our goal, in this
paper, is to characterize the best achievable tradeo®s among ¢, Rc and Re that maintain
reliable estimation of V . In particular, we will be interested in the embedding capacity,
Ce(Rc;¢), which is the supremum of all achievable embedding rates for (Rc;¢).
4 Main Result
Let A denote the set of all triples (U;X;Y ) of random variables taking values in ¯nite sets
U, X, Y, where X is the alphabet of the covertext, Y is the alphabet of the stegotext,
and U is an arbitrary ¯nite alphabet of size jUj · jXj ¢ jYj + 1, and the joint probability
distribution of (U;X;Y ), PUXY (u;x;y), is such that the marginal distribution of X is PX,
and Ed(X;Y ) · ¢. For any triple (U;X;Y ), there exists a related quadruple (U;X;Y;Z),
with Z taking values in Z, such that
PU;X;Y;Z(u;x;y;z) = PU;X;Y (u;x;y)PZjY (zjy); (21)
where PZjY (zjy) is a transition probability of the discrete stationary memoryless attack
channel.
We now present the main result of this paper, which is a single-letter characterization
of the achievable region of (Rc;Re;¢).
Theorem 1. Given a DMS PX, an embedding rate Re is achievable for a pair (Rc;¢) if
and only if there exists a triple of random variables (U;X;Y ) 2 A satisfying
Re · minfI(U;Z) ¡ I(U;X);Rc ¡ I(X;U;Y )g: (22)
8The proof of the converse part of Theorem 1 is given in Section 5, and the proof of the
direct part is provided in Section 6.
Obviously, the maximum achievable embedding rate Ce(Rc;¢) is obtained by taking
maximum among all the triples (U;X;Y ) 2 A maintaining the conditions of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. The embedding capacity Ce(Rc;¢) for a DMS Q is given by:
Ce(Rc;¢) = max
(U;X;Y )2A
minfI(U;Z) ¡ I(U;X);Rc ¡ I(X;U;Y )g: (23)
Discussion:
The embedding capacity of the public watermarking scheme is, of course, smaller than
or equal to the one obtained in private watermarking [13]. It should be pointed out that
(22) and (23) are not obtained by a straightforward extension of the well-known analysis
of Gel'fand and Pinsker [20], where the maximum achievable embedding rate was found
without constraining the allowable distortion of the covertext and without requirements on
the compressibility of the codewords. Neither the direct scheme proposed in [20] nor the
proof of the converse part of [20] lend themselves to characterizing tradeo®s between the
embedding rate and the composite rate. Here, an alternative coding scheme is proposed,
which not only achieves the embedding capacity of [20], but also allows a characterization
of a tradeo® between the embedding and the composite rates. The two schemes di®er in
their ways of creating of composite sequences. In [20], after choosing an auxiliary codeword
U = (U1;:::;UN) for a pair (X;V ), a composite sequence Y = (Y1;:::;YN) is created by Yi =
f(Ui;Xi), for some function f, and the only quantitative characterization on the possible
compression rate is that it is upper-bounded by H(Y ). The mechanism of generating the
composite sequences, proposed in this paper, is di®erent and more complex than that of
Gel'fand and Pinsker [20] (and these proposed in [7]-[10]) and this is in order to provide an
enumerable composite set and to maintain the distortion constraint.
The proof of the converse part is strongly based on that of [20]. It should be noted that
both the proposed coding scheme and the converse proof camou°age the fact that although
the schemes were originally planned to provide reliable retrieval of the watermark from the
distorted version of the composite sequence, reliable retrieval of the watermark is possible
also directly from the composite sequence.
Corollary 1 presents the result of Theorem 1 in terms of the maximum achievable em-
bedding rate - Ce(Rc;¢). Another way to present Theorem 1 is in terms of the minimum
9achievable composite rate:
Corollary 2. The minimum achievable composite rate R¤
c(Re;¢) is given by:
R¤
c(Re;¢) = Re + minI(X;U;Y ); (24)
where the minimum is over A
T
f(U;X;Y ) : Re · I(U;Z) ¡ I(U;X)g.
In an attack-free case [22], where Z = Y and the optimal choice of the auxiliary is U = Y ,
the result of (22) coincides with that of [22].
An extension of this work can be done for the case of continuous alphabets ([18], ch.
7), by considering the supremum of minfI(Ud;Zp)¡I(Ud;Xp);Rc ¡I(Xp;Ud;Yp)g over all
¯nite-alphabet auxiliary variables Ud and all partitions Xd, Yd and Zd of the source, chan-
nel input and channel output alphabets, respectively. The achievability scheme can also
be presented directly, following the lines of the scheme provided in Section 6, where the
considered sequences should satisfy weak typicality (see, e.g., [16], pp. 225 ¡ 227) rather
than strong typicality used for the ¯nite-alphabets case. This scheme demonstrates well
a great di®erence between the continuous and the ¯nite-alphabets cases: the number of
composite sequences is ¯nite for the ¯nite-alphabet case, while for the case of continu-
ous alphabets, there are in¯nitely many usable auxiliary and stegotext sequences. So, we
can generate arbitrarily many distinct auxiliary and composite codebooks, that di®er from
each other only by arbitrarily small perturbations of one (representative) auxiliary and one
corresponding stegotext codebook, with each auxiliary codebook representing a di®erent
watermarking message. The minimum sizes of these auxiliary and composite codes are dic-
tated by properties of typical sequences, and a variation of the Rate-Distortion Theorem
[17], respectively, establishing the ¯rst upper-bound to the embedding rate, in terms of the
composite rate allowed. Now, in the presence of the attack, the number of usable auxiliary
sequences is limited by the standard channel-coding argument, i.e., we cannot use more
auxiliary codewords than we can distinguish at the output of the attack channel, and as a
consequence, an additional upper-bound to Re is determined. But, in an attack-free case,
no channel coding is performed, the watermark is retrievable directly from the sent com-
posite sequence, and therefore, the upper-bound I(U;Z) ¡ I(U;X) to Re can be omitted,
bringing us back to the result of [22], since the choice of U = Y provides us with the highest
achievable embedding rate for a given Rc.
105 Proof of the Converse Part of Theorem 1
Let
¡
ÁN;'N¢
be a given encoder-decoder pair for which Ed(X;Y) · ¢, 1
NH(ÁN(X;V )) ·
Rc and Pe · ². We start with Fano's inequality:
H(V jZ) · h(Pe) + Pe log(M ¡ 1) · 1 + PeNRe; (25)
where h(¢) is the binary entropy function. Since V ! Y ! Z is a Markov chain, (25)
implies:
H(V jY) · H(V jZ) · 1 + PeNRe: (26)
The embedding rate can therefore be upper-bounded as follows:
NRe
(a)
= H(V ) (27)
= H(V jX)
= H(V jX;Y) + I(V ;YjX)
= H(V jY) + I(V ;YjX) ¡ I(V ;XjY)
(b)
· 1 + PeNRe + H(YjX) ¡ H(YjV;X) ¡ I(V ;XjY)
(c)
= 1 + PeNRe + H(Y) ¡ I(X;Y) ¡ I(V ;XjY)
= 1 + PeNRe + H(Y) ¡ I(X;V;Y)
· 1 + PeNRe + NRc ¡ I(X;V;Y);
where:
(a) follows from the assumption V has a uniform distribution,
(b) from (26),
(c) from the fact that Y is a function of (X;V ):
Following [20], let us de¯ne N auxiliary random variables e U(1);:::e U(N):
e U(i) = (V;Zi¡1
1 ;XN
i+1): (28)
Then,
I(X;V;Y)
(a)
= I(X;V;Y;Z) (29)
=
N X
i=1
I(Xi;V;Y;ZjXN
i+1)
11(b)
=
N X
i=1
I(Xi;V;Y;ZjXN
i+1) +
N X
i=1
I(Xi;XN
i+1)
=
N X
i=1
I(Xi;V;Y;Z;XN
i+1)
=
N X
i=1
I(Xi;V;Zi¡1
1 ;XN
i+1;Yi;Y i¡1
1 ;Y N
i+1;ZN
i )
(c)
¸
N X
i=1
I(Xi; e U(i);Yi); (30)
where:
(a) follows from the Markov chain X ! (V;Y) ! Z: (31)
(b) from the fact that the covertext source is memoryless, and
(c) from the data processing theorem and (28):
On substituting (29) into (27), we obtain
NRe · 1 + PeNRe + NRc ¡
N X
i=1
I(Xi; e U(i);Yi): (32)
Also, from the proof of the converse part of [20], it is known that
NRe · 1 + PeNRe +
N X
i=1
[I(e U(i);Zi) ¡ I(e U(i);Xi)]: (33)
Combining (32) with (33) and dividing the resulting inequality by N, gives:
Re(1 ¡ Pe) ¡
1
N
· min
½
1
N
N X
i=1
[I(e U(i);Zi) ¡ I(e U(i);Xi)];Rc ¡
1
N
N X
i=1
I(Xi; e U(i);Yi)
¾
:(34)
Now, consider a time-sharing random variable T distributed uniformly over f1;2;:::;Ng,
independently of all other random variables in the system, and let us denote a quadruple
of random variables
(e U;X;Y;Z)
4
= (e UT;XT;YT;ZT): (35)
The probability distribution of (e U;X;Y;Z) is given by:
Prf(e U;X;Y;Z) = (e u;x;y;z)g =
1
N
N X
n=1
Prf(e Un;Xn;Yn;Zn) = (e u;x;y;z)g: (36)
Therefore, by de¯nition of T:
1
N
N X
i=1
[I(e U(i);Zi) ¡ I(e U(i);Xi)] = I(e U;ZjT) ¡ I(e U;XjT) (37)
12= I(e U;T;Z) ¡ I(Z;T) ¡ I(e U;T;X) + I(X;T)
· I(e U;T;Z) ¡ I(e U;T;X);
where the last step is due to the fact that X is stationary and memoryless and hence,
I(X;T) = 0, and the fact that I(Z;T) is non-negative. Also,
1
N
N X
i=1
I(Xi; e U(i);Yi) = I(X; e U;Y jT) (38)
= I(X; e U;Y jT) + I(X;T)
= I(X; e U;T;Y );
where the second equality is again due to the fact that X is stationary and memoryless.
Let us de¯ne now a new random variable U
4
= (e U;T). Exchanging variables in (37)
and (38) and substituting the obtained result into (34), provides us with the following
expression:
Re(1 ¡ Pe) ¡
1
N
· min
©
I(U;Z) ¡ I(U;X);Rc ¡ I(X;U;Y )
ª
: (39)
By hypothesis, the given system satis¯es Pe · ², and hence, by taking the limit ² ! 0 as
N ! 1 in (39), we obtain:
Re · min
©
I(U;Z) ¡ I(U;X);Rc ¡ I(X;U;Y )
ª
: (40)
Next, the expected distortion constraint is satis¯ed by the system, and so,
¢ ¸ Ed(X;Y) (41)
=
X
x;y
Prf(X;Y) = (x;y)g
1
N
N X
i=1
d(xi;yi)
=
1
N
N X
i=1
X
x;y
Prf(Xi;Yi) = (x;y)gd(x;y)
=
X
x;y
Prf(X;Y ) = (x;y)gd(x;y)
= Ed(X;Y ):
It remains to show that the alphabet of the random variable U can be limited by
jUj · jXj¢jYj+1. To this end, we will use the support lemma (cf. [15]), which is based on
Carath¶ eodory's theorem, according to which, given J real valued continuous functionals fj,
j = 1;:::;J on the set P(X) of probability distributions over the alphabets X, and given any
13probability measure ¹ on the Borel ¾-algebra of P(X), there exist J elements Q1;:::QJ of
P(X) and J non-negative reals, ®1;:::;®J, such that
PJ
j=1 ®j = 1 and for every j = 1;:::;J
Z
P(X)
fj(Q)¹(dQ) =
J X
i=1
®ifj(Qi): (42)
Before we actually apply the support lemma, we ¯rst rewrite the relevant mutual informa-
tions of (40) in a more convenient form for the use of this lemma. As for the ¯rst upper
bound to Re, we have:
I(U;Z) ¡ I(U;X) = H(Z) ¡ H(ZjU) ¡ H(X) + H(XjU); (43)
and for the second upper bound to Re, we have
Rc ¡ I(X;U;Y ) = Rc ¡ I(X;U) ¡ I(X;Y jU) (44)
= Rc ¡ H(X) + H(XjU) ¡ H(XjU) + H(XjU;Y )
= Rc ¡ H(X) + H(XjU;Y )
= Rc ¡ H(X) + H(X;Y jU) ¡ H(Y jU): (45)
For a given joint distribution of (X;Y;Z), H(Z) and H(X) are both given and una®ected by
U. Therefore, in order to preserve prescribed values of I(U;Z)¡I(U;X) and Rc¡I(X;U;Y ),
it is su±cient the preserve the associated values H(XjU) ¡ H(ZjU) and H(X;Y jU) ¡
H(Y jU).
Let us de¯ne the the following functionals of a generic distribution Q over X £Y, where
X £ Y is assumed, without loss of generality, to be f1;2;:::;mg, m
4
= jXj ¢ jYj:
fi(Q) = Q(x;y); i
4
= (x;y) = 1;:::;m ¡ 1 (46)
fm(Q) =
X
x;y
Q(x;y)
X
z
PZjY (zjy)log
P
x;y Q(x;y)PZjY (zjy)
P
y;z Q(x;y)PZjY (zjy)
: (47)
Next de¯ne
fm+1(Q) =
X
x;y
Q(x;y)log
P
x Q(x;y)
Q(x;y)
: (48)
Applying now the support lemma, we ¯nd that there exists a random variable U (jointly
distributed with (X;Y )), whose alphabet size is jUj = m + 1 = jXj ¢ jYj + 1 and it satis¯es
simultaneously:
X
u
PrfU = ugfi(P(¢ju)) = PXY (x;y); i = 1;:::;m ¡ 1; (49)
14X
u
PrfU = ugfm(P(¢ju)) = H(XjU) ¡ H(ZjU); (50)
and
X
u
PrfU = ugfm+1(P(¢ju)) = H(X;Y jU) ¡ H(Y jU): (51)
It should be pointed out that this random variable maintains the prescribed distortion level
Ed(X;Y) of the system, since the PXY (x;y) is preserved. This completes the proof of the
converse part.
6 Proof of the Direct Part of Theorem 1
In this section, we show that given a triple of random variables (U;X;Y ) 2 A and positive
numbers Re, Rc and ¢ such that Re · minfI(U;Z) ¡ I(U;X);Rc ¡ I(X;U;Y )g and
Ed(X;Y ) · ¢, then for any ² > 0 and su±ciently large N, there exists a code of embedding
rate Re, for the attack channel PZjY , with composite rate below Rc, error probability Pe · ²,
and Ed(X;Y) · (1 + ²)¢.
Let us denote three functions of a scalar ± > 0, which will be used later on:
²b
4
= (±2 ¡ 2±)H(U) ¡ (±2 + 2±)H(UjX) ¡ ±; (52)
²y
4
= (±2 ¡ 2±)H(Y jU) ¡ (±2 + 2±)H(Y jX;U) ¡ ±; (53)
and
²u
4
= (±2 ¡ 2±)H(Z) ¡ (±2 + 2±)H(ZjU) ¡ ±: (54)
We next describe the mechanisms of random code selection and the encoding and decoding
operations. Fix ± such that 2± + maxf2 ¢ exp¡2N±
+2¡N±;±2g · ².
Auxiliary Code Generation:
We ¯rst construct an auxiliary code capable of embedding 2NRe watermarks by a random
selection technique. First, 2NRu, Ru · I(U;Z) ¡ ²u ¡ ±, sequences fUig, i 2 [1;:::;2NRu],
are drawn independently from T ±
PU. Let us denote the set of these sequences by C. The
elements of C are equally distributed between M
4
= 2NRe bins, each bin of size m = 2NR,
R ¸ I(X;U) + ²b + ±. A di®erent watermark index is attached to each bin, identifying a
15sub-code representing the watermark. We denote the codewords of bin v, v 2 [1;2;:::;M],
by U(v;k), k 2 [1;2;:::;m].
Composite Sequence Generation:
For each auxiliary sequence U(v;k) = u, a set of my
4
= 2NRy, Ry ¸ I(X;Y jU) + ²y + ±,
composite sequences fYjg, j 2 [1;:::;my], are independently drawn from T ±
PY jU(u). We
denote this set by C(U(v;k)) and its elements by Y(v;C(U(v;k));j). Note that the 2NRu
sets fC(U(v;k))g may not be all mutually exclusive.
Encoding/Embedding:
Upon receiving a pair (x;v), the encoder acts as follows:
1. If x 2 T±
PX and bin number v contains a sequence U(v;k) = u such that (s.t.) the
pair (x;u) 2 T±
PXY , the ¯rst Y(v;C(U(v;k));j) = y found in C(U(v;k)), such that
(x;u;y) 2 T±
PXUY , is chosen for transmission. If there exist more than one jointly
±-typical with x sequences, the described above process is applied to the the ¯rst
matching U(v;k) found in a bin's list.
2. If x = 2 T±
PX, or @U(v;k) = u s.t. (x;u;y) 2 T ±
PXUY , an arbitrary error message is
transmitted.
Decoding:
Upon receiving Z = z , the decoder ¯nds all sequences fU(v;k) = ug, so that the pairs
(u;z) 2 T±
PUZ. If all found fU(v;k)g belong to a single bin, the index of this bin is decoded
as the watermark e v. Otherwise (if @U(v;k) = u s.t. (u;z) 2 T ±
PUZ or there exist more than
one bin containing such a sequence), an error is declared.
We now turn to the analysis of the error probability, the distortion, and the compress-
ibility of the composite sequence. For each pair (v;x), a particular choice of a code C and
related choices of fC(U(v;k))g, the possible causes for incorrect watermark decoding are
the following:
1. x = 2 T±
PX. Let the probability of this event be de¯ned as Pe1.
162. x 2 T±
PX, but in bin no. v @u s.t. (x;u) 2 T±
PXU. Let the probability of this event be
de¯ned as Pe2.
3. x 2 T±
PX, and bin no. v contains U(v;k) = u s.t. (x;u) 2 T ±
PXU, but @y 2 C(U(v;k))
s.t. (x;u;y) 2 T±
PXUY . Let the probability of this event be de¯ned as Pe3.
4. x 2 T±
PX, and bin no. v contains u s.t. (x;u;y) 2 T ±
PXUY , but (u;z) = 2 T±
PUZ. Let the
probability of this event be de¯ned as Pe4.
5. x 2 T±
PX, in bin no. v 9u s.t. (x;u;y) 2 T±
PXUY and (u;z) 2 T±
PUZ, but there exists
another bin no. e v that contains e u s.t. (z; e u) 2 T±
PUZ. Let the probability of this event
be de¯ned as Pe5.
If none of those events occur, the message v is retrieved correctly from z, and the distortion
constraint between x and y is satis¯ed, as follows from (12).
The average probability of error Pe is bounded by
Pe · Pe1 + Pe2 + Pe3 + Pe4 + Pe5: (55)
The fact that Pe1 ! 0 follows from (9). As for Pe2, we have:
Pe2
4
=
m Y
k=1
Prf(x;U(v;k)) = 2 T±
PXUg: (56)
Now, by (8), for every k:
Prf(x;U(v;k)) = 2 T±
PXUg = 1 ¡ Prf(x;U(v;k)) 2 T ±
PXUg (57)
= 1 ¡
jT±
PUjX(x)j
jT±
PUj
· 1 ¡
2N[(1+±)2H(UjX)]
2N[(1¡±)2H(U)¡±]
= 1 ¡ 2¡N[I(X;U)+²b];
where ²b is given by (52). Substitution of (57) into (56) provides us with the following
upper-bound:
Pe2 ·
h
1 ¡ 2¡N[I(X;U)+²b]
im
· exp
½
¡ 2NR ¢ 2¡N[I(X;U)+²b]
¾
! 0; (58)
double-exponentially rapidly since R ¸ I(X;U) + ²b + ±.
17To estimate Pe3, we repeat the technique of the previous step:
Pe3
4
=
my Y
j=1
Prf(x;Y(v;C(U(v;k));j)) = 2 T ±
PXY g: (59)
Again, by the property of the typical sequences, for every j:
Prf(x;Y(v;C(U(v;k));j)) = 2 T ±
PXY g · 1 ¡ 2¡N[I(X;Y jU)+²y]; (60)
where ²y is given by (53) and therefore, substitution of (60) into (59) gives
Pe3 ·
h
1 ¡ 2¡N[I(X;Y jU)+²y]
imy
· exp
½
¡ 2NRy ¢ 2¡N[I(X;Y jU)+²y]
¾
! 0; (61)
double-exponentially rapidly since Ry ¸ I(X;Y jU) + ²y + ±.
The estimation of Pe4 is again based on property of typical sequences. Since Z is an out-
put of N successive uses of a memoryless attack channel PZjY with input Y(v;C(U(v;k));j)
and by the assumption of this step (x;U(v;k);Y(v;C(U(v;k));j)) 2 T ±
PXUY , from (9) we
obtain
Pe4 = Prf(x;U(v;k);Y(v;C(U(v;k));j);Z) = 2 T ±
PXUY Zg · ±; (62)
and similarly to Pe1 can be made as small as desired by an appropriate choice of ±.
Finally, we estimate Pe5 as follows:
Pe5 = Prf9e v 6= v : (U(e v;k);Z) 2 T ±
PUZg (63)
·
X
e v6=v;k2[1;2;:::;m]
Prf(U(e v;k);Z) 2 T±
PUZg
· (2NRe ¡ 1)2NR PrfU(e v;k);Z 2 T±
PUZg
· 2NRu2¡N[I(U;Z)¡²u]; (64)
where ²u is given by (54). Now, since Ru · I(U;Z) ¡ ²u ¡ ±, Pe5 ! 0.
Since Pei ! 0 for i = 1,2,3,4,5, their sum tends to zero as well, implying that there
exist at least one choice of an auxiliary code C and related choices of sets fC(U(v;k))g that
give rise to the reliable watermark decoding.
The embedding rate of the above described scheme is determined by the maximum
possible number of auxiliary bins, i.e.,
Re =
1
N
log
µ
Ru
m
¶
(65)
· I(U;Z) ¡ I(U;X) ¡ ²b ¡ ²u ¡ 2±:
18Now, let us denote by Nc the total number of composite sequences used in the described
above scheme:
Nc = M ¢ m ¢ my = 2N[Re+I(X;U;Y )+²b+²y]: (66)
For su±ciently small values of ±, ²b and ²y vanish and can be neglected, giving Nc =
2N[Re+I(X;U;Y )]. Now, since the compression procedure applied to the composite sequences
is lossless, it satis¯es
1
N
H(Y) ·
1
N
log(Nc) = Re + I(X;U;Y ) · Rc; (67)
which completes the proof of the direct part. Finally, since ²b, ²u and ± are arbitrarily small,
Re can be made as close as desired to minfI(U;Z) ¡ I(U;X);Rc ¡ I(X;U;Y )g.
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